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I. Introduction
In a recent paper, Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) – hereafter LWL – examined
the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies in a closed economy with
sticky prices and non-Ricardian consumers (finitely-lived agents face a higher
discount factor than the government). These deviations from the neo-classical
framework implied a richer set of interactions between policies than the usual
channel of seigniorage revenues or surprise inflation at the core of the Fiscal
Theory of the Price Level (FTPL). LWL demonstrated that two stable policy re-
gimes could be identified: in the first one, monetary policy would be ‘active’ in
the sense determined by Leeper (1991), i.e. reacting toughly to inflation devia-
tions from their steady-state value; while fiscal policy would be ‘passive’, i.e. re-
acting toughly to public debt deviations from their steady-state value. In the sec-
ond one, monetary policy’s reactions towards inflation would be smoother
whereas the government would stabilise public debt very slowly. This case was
the closest to Woodford’s work (2001) dealing with the FTPL.
                                                          
∗ I gratefully acknowledge Campbell Leith and an anonymous referee for providing me
with very helpful and comprehensive comments. My thanks also go to João Amador,
Gerhard Illing, Patrick Minford, Alvaro Pina and Matthias Sutter for their stimulative advice
and remarks. I thank participants at various presentations (EMU Macroeconomic Institu-
tions and Policies Conference, Milan, 2001; Royal Economic Society Conference, Dur-
ham, 2001; Colloque annuel du GDR Monnaie et Financement, Pau, 2001) for their re-
marks. The usual disclaimer applies.
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This theory states that the price level can be determined through the fulfilment
of the intertemporal government budget constraint. This implies that a govern-
ment can exogenously fix his real spending and revenue plans, and that the
price level will take on the value required to adjust the real value of its contrac-
tual nominal debt obligations to ensure government solvency. The mechanism
underlying the FTPL is linked to a wealth effect (Woodford 2001): if the se-
quence of future primary fiscal deficits entails an increase in the contractual
nominal debt obligations of the government, households will feel wealthier and
will consume more, so that the general price level will be increased until the
government budget constraint has been satisfied.1
The FTPL has already been extended to the case of a monetary union
(Woodford 1996; Bergin 2000), but within a neo-classical framework and without
nominal inertia in the price setting in the short run. Moreover, net external assets
were not included, although they may help the stabilisation process of both
economies after a shock.
We thus extend LWL model with sticky prices to the case of two countries en-
gaged in a monetary union and in considering optimal policies as the outcome of
a static game between the two fiscal authorities and the European Central Bank
(ECB).2 We also specifically study the possible asymmetric implications of the
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), i.e. the possibility that one country could be
unable to react to a shock because it has no fiscal room for manoeuvre,
whereas the other country could implement a fiscal policy to stabilise the
economy.3
The fiscal framework in the model can be justified on two grounds. First, as
regards the static-game approach in a dynamic model, justifications can bear on
the following argument: it is straightforward to show that, in the Euro area,
countries do not abide by strictly to the dispositions of the Broad Economic Pol-
icy Guidelines (BEPG) and move back each year the deadline for achieving a
‘closed-to-balance’ government budget (EC 2001). Governments thus seem to
act rather inconsistently, without generally taking full account of their present
policies for the future. Second, pragmatism can also be called up to justify the
asymmetry in the fiscal framework between the two countries within the mone-
tary union. Such an asymmetry in fiscal policy rules is not unlikely in the Euro
area. Though the Maastricht’s norm on public debt has been wiped out as re-
gards the entry of some countries in the Euro area, the public finances in these
countries (Belgium, Italy and Greece) are still carefully supervised by their EU
                                                          
1 Contrary to what Buiter (2002) claims about this constraint, it is usually not used as an
“equilibrium condition” in the FTPL, and is valid for all possible values of the price level
and output.
2 Extending the model to a dynamic-game framework is beyond the scope of the pres-
ent paper, though it might well lead to different results.
3 Indeed, the Stability and Growth Pact prevents countries in the Euro area from in-
creasing public deficits over 3% of their GDP, except in the case of a substantial slump.
Countries which would not satisfy the Pact may incur fines (cf. Beetsma and Uhlig 1999,
for a stylised rationale of this Pact). As fines may be long to come (the process under
which European countries may order the fine lasts two years), the SGP may not appear
‘credible’. In the following, we however consider that the SGP is so credible as to be satis-
fied by any country over the deficit limit.
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partners4, by the Commission, via the SGP and the implementation of the
BEPGs, or by the ECB before it sets the European nominal interest rate. Not to
speak, of course, of the recent difficulties of Germany and Portugal (1st quarter
of 2002) to dampen the rise in their respective fiscal deficits… This supervision
of indebted countries or temporary difficulties to satisfy the BEPGs necessitate
that countries under close scrutiny limit their deficit and tend towards a balanced
budget at least. Other countries with sound public finances do not, of course,
face the same constraints when setting either receipts or expenditures.
Our main objective here is to assess the macroeconomic incidence of this pe-
culiar fiscal setting when countries in the Euro area face symmetric shocks.
Though these shocks are more easily circumvented than asymmetric shocks –
the ECB should be able to stabilise the economy without fiscal policies –, unco-
ordinated policies with one government following a balanced-budget rule may be
very counter-productive for the ECB and for the government with sound public
finances. This thus gives a new argument in favour of coordinated monetary and
fiscal policies.
The paper is structured as follows. In section II, we present LWL model briefly.
In section III, we outline our analytical framework, stressing its most notable
features. Section IV provides an assessment of the consequences of symmetric
supply and demand shocks in the monetary union. The shocks are supposed to
be permanent. For each shock, we study the Nash equilibrium between the
three policy makers and then compare it to a cooperative equilibrium which we
computed according to the Nash-bargaining procedure. Section V stresses the
most substantial costs emerging from the implementation of the dispositions of
the SGP. Section VI brings out some conclusions.
II. Leith and Wren-Lewis Model
LWL (2000) showed that independent central banks cannot ignore what the
government is doing with fiscal policy in a closed economy. However, as long as
government adjusts its spending or taxes to meet a target for government debt,
central bankers can raise the real interest rates by as much as they want in or-
der to hit their inflation targets. The direct implication of this process is that while
fiscal policy must react to some extent to variations in government debt, their re-
sponse needs not be dramatic. Stated briefly, this does not seem to legitimate
the tight control of fiscal policy implied by the SGP.
The model of LWL originates in the Blanchard-Yaari (1985) perpetual youth
model: since households face a finite life, they consider (a part of) public debt as
                                                          
4 Quoted in the FT, June 5 2001: “The performance of Silvio Berlusconi’s centre-right
government will be watched closely by its European Union partners over the next few
months. No aspect will come under closer scrutiny than its management of Italy’s public
finances. (…) The level of Italy’s sovereign debt is still nearly double that permitted by the
Maastricht treaty (…). Many Europeans are, therefore, anxiously waiting to see whether
Mr Berlusconi (…) can maintain the same level of fiscal rigour (…) as the centre-left did in
years gone by.” (Italy Survey, p. II).
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net wealth. Aggregate demand thus depends positively on public debt and pub-
lic spending, negatively on taxation:
tttt GcTkBY +−= , where B represents public debt, T taxation, G public
spending and parameters ‘k’ and ‘c’ are positive.
The Phillips curve is such that:
tt aY=π& , where π&  is the inflation rate in time difference.
With parameter ‘a’ negative (resp. positive), this equation is a forward-looking
(resp. backward-looking) Phillips curve.
LWL consider two specifications for fiscal policy. If the government stabilises
public debt via public spending, the fiscal framework is of the following form:
[Case 1] [ ]BBfGG tt −+= , and tt YT τ= ,
where τ  is the tax rate, a superscript is a target value, and a subscript is time.
Government spending responds to public debt deviations from the target and
taxation is applied at a constant rate.
The alternative framework is of the form:
[Case 2] [ ]BBfTT tt −+=  and GGt = . The government adjusts taxation
to meet its public debt target; and government spending is assumed to be
constant.5
On empirical grounds, one should favour case 1 for the fiscal framework. Ale-
sina and Perotti (1995) demonstrated that fiscal adjustments were more efficient
when expenditures had been reduced, rather than taxation increased. LWL also
favour case 1 in their numerical simulations. Reason for this is the little influence
of taxation on output and inflation, a situation which denies any substantial fiscal
feedbacks on the optimal monetary policy (LWL p. C101).6 In the model used
below, introducing either a modified version of case 1 or a modified version of
case 2 gives the same qualitative results.7
In their conclusion, LWL state that, if fiscal policy is relatively active in
Leeper’s sense – debt is stabilised very slowly, whatever the case for fiscal pol-
icy is chosen –, then this puts severe constraints on what monetary policy can
do. If monetary policy responds to excess inflation by raising real interest rates,
this will lead to destabilising movements in output as government debt “ex-
plodes”. However, as long as fiscal policy is sufficiently passive, central bankers
are free to raise real interest rates by as much as they want. The implication is
                                                          
5 This fiscal framework owes to the seminal work on fiscal rules by Sachs and Wyplosz
(1984).
6 Adding a second country automatically increases the fiscal feedbacks on monetary
policy, via the fiscal policy of the second country and, thus, tends to limit the above argu-
ment by LWL.
7 In our model, in cases 1 and 2, the tax rate and public spending in each country are
set respectively as the outcome of a game between the two governments and the ECB.
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that one needs to ensure that fiscal policy responds to some extent to changes
in government debt, but this response needs not be as tough as what the SGP
seems to generate.
III. Some Extensions to the Previous Model
In the following, we concentrate on the implications of policy rules interactions
in the open economy and, more explicitly, in a monetary union. Consumers
therefore hold their wealth not only in the form of public debt but also in the form
of external assets. In such a situation, within a monetary union, i.e. in the ab-
sence of any exchange rate risk, a target for public debt is needed in order to
determine the allocation of wealth between net foreign assets and public debt.
This is a technical reason for justifying the implementation of fiscal policy rules.
Without a target on public debt, wealth could in fact be balanced with unstable
and symmetric levels of public debt and external assets.8
LWL model is simplified in two respects, with minor consequences on their re-
sults: we do not take human wealth nor money into account. The latter exclusion
is studied in LWL model. Finally, we extend it in seven respects. Four are linked
to the open economy and policy rules: two countries and a common central
bank (which we call the ECB) are introduced; we consider an asymmetry in the
fiscal framework between the two governments; policy rules are the outcomes of
a static game between the two governments and the ECB; and cooperative
equilibria are computed. Two other assumptions deal with consumption: a
wealth effect which resembles the Pigouvian “real balance” effect and a non-
linear effect of the real interest rate on aggregate demand are included. Last,
backward-looking inflation expectations are assumed.
1. The General Framework
We study a polar case in the EMU: two countries, identical as far as private
behaviours are concerned, form a monetary union.9 Households in both coun-
tries hold their wealth under the form of domestic public debt (D) and net foreign
assets (F). The model drops the Blanchard (1985) specification of intertemporal
consumption which is at the heart of LWL’s model and replaces it with a specifi-
cation where (still non-Ricardian) consumers consume their current income (in-
cluding interests received on net financial wealth), plus a proportion of their fi-
nancial wealth. This specification can be found, for instance, in Creel (2002).
                                                          
8 In a flexible exchange rate regime or in a EMS-type regime, the uncertainty regarding
the future value of external assets denominated in foreign currencies and/or the risk aver-
sion by households are sufficient conditions for determining the discrepancy between do-
mestic and foreign assets.
9 Asymmetric private interdependence between the two countries (for instance, different
pace of adjustment for prices or wages after a shock, as in Hughes Hallett, 1986) are be-
yond the scope of the present paper.
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As in Tobin & Buiter (1976)10, private agents are assumed to form wealth
plans W&  which positively depend on disposable income net of wealth interests
( )( )Yτ−1 , but also on the real interest rate ( )ρ . If actual real wealth differs from
planned wealth, households behaviour makes it adjust to its desired level at
speed µ . The demand block of the model is therefore given by a somewhat
usual IS curve.11
(1) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ttttttttttttt XG*Y*YWWWYY ++−+−+−++−= ππηεηµρτ &1
where: ( )( ) tttt YW τβρα −+= 1& , and α  and β  are positive parameters.
Aggregate demand increases with disposable income plus interests on wealth
( )Wρ , with the gap between actual and planned wealth, with public spending
(G) and with a private demand shock (X). The additional terms in output and in-
flation differentials reflect spillovers from the second country through the trade
balance. The ε parameter represents the elasticity of the trade balance to the
variations of the inflation differential; it is positive; η is the degree of openness.
Aggregate demand depends negatively on the real interest rate in the short
run, and positively in the long run. In short, the substitution effect overcomes the
wealth effect in the short run while the reverse is true in the long run. The wealth
effect is close to the Pigouvian or “real balance” effect: if actual wealth is be-
neath its planned level, because of an increase in the real interest rate, private
consumption will be reduced until savings has reached the desired equilibrium
level. In the long run, households will use this savings in order to boost their own
consumption.
The existence of a net wealth effect in private consumption has been proven
to be a necessary condition for LWL’s model to be stable insofar as backward-
looking expectations are assumed (see Creel and Sterdyniak 2002). In the fol-
lowing, we will hinge on Fuhrer (1997) or Mankiw (2001) and thus favour adap-
tive expectations as our specification for inflation dynamics, although some re-
cent results favour rational expectations on empirical grounds (see Gali et al.
2001).12 Here, we wish to concentrate on the interactions between fiscal and
monetary policies only, without any interference with a fourth player, namely
households. Assuming adaptive expectations, we can neglect this fourth player
while in the meantime being assured that in the long run, inflationary expecta-
tions will be met (Blake and Weale 1998). Another way to motivate the adaptive
expectations assumption would be to argue that the private sector may act
                                                          
10 They stated that savings shall be regarded as a process which adjusts wealth to-
wards some target value relative to income.
11 Equations in country B are obtained by circular permutation; this country’s variables
are starred.
12 Gali et al. (2001) claim that they provide evidence that a forward-looking Phillips
curve “fits very well Euro data” but, in their study, the expected inflation depends only on
past variables. Note that Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2001), hinging on the methodology
developed by Gali et al. (2001), show that only Germany out of five European countries
support the forward-looking Phillips curve. In the other four countries (France, Italy, Spain,
the Netherlands), they find a substantial inertial behaviour in inflation.
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adaptively during the early stages of Monetary Union as they learn more about
the new policy regime.
Aggregate supply is thus derived according to a standard Phillips curve in the
open economy (eq. (2)). Real wages are indexed on the consumer price index
(inputs are not imported).
(2) ( ) tttttt z*Y +−++= − ππηλππ 1 .,
where z is a supply shock and λ is positive.
Wealth (eq. 3) is the sum of public debt and net foreign assets which grow
after a trade deficit:
(3) ttt FDW += .
Equations (4) and (5) describe the dynamics of these two assets:
(4) ( ) tttttt YGDD τρ −++= −11 ;
(5) ( ) ( ) ( )ttttttt *Y*YFF ππηεηρ −+−++= −11 .
The model is supposed to be quarterly. Shocks occur in the first quarter of
2000 and are permanent.
2. Governments and the ECB
The two countries, named respectively A and B, share a common currency.
The ECB implements the monetary policy in the union. The rest of the world is
neglected. The fiscal policy framework is asymmetric.
2.1. Government A
Government A uses its tax rate to minimise its loss function (eq. 6) each
quarter so that its policies are strategic, rather than ad hoc as in LWL.13 The
quadratic loss function depends on the differences between respectively, output,
inflation, tax rate and public debt, on the one hand; and their initial steady-state
values, on the other. Public debt is expressed in percent of the GDP.
(6) ( )23222120 tttttt Y/DaaaYaLG ∆+∆+∆+∆= τπ
Parameters 210 a,a,a and 3a  are positive weights on respective targets. Tar-
gets for output and inflation are uncontroversial. The loss function also includes
a term which captures the costs of tax collection (Barro 1979). In country A, the
government has to stabilise public debt over GDP, at least in the long run. This
                                                          
13 In order to simplify notations, an intertemporal discount rate was not added in the loss
functions. We do not intend to compare losses from one period to the other but, rather, at
a certain time, from one equilibrium (Nash) to the other (cooperation).
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is in line with LWL’s conclusions according to which fiscal authorities have to re-
spond somewhat to changes in government debt.
2.2. Government B
Government B implements a fiscal rule which keeps public deficits in line with
the stability of its debt to GDP ratio. It is thus assumed that country B has al-
ready reached the ceiling of the SGP, considered here as the steady state level
of the public deficit ratio. As stated earlier, case 1 for fiscal instruments in LWL
(cf. section II) is favoured to case 2. Public spending, rather than taxes, are set
in order to stabilise public debt (in GDP share). A lag in government spending is
also introduced and represents the relative inertial behaviour of expenditures.
Moreover, government B is able to use its tax rate τ  to minimise the same loss
function as government A:
(7) ( ) 23222120 *tt*t*t*tt Y/*DaaaYa*LG ∆+∆+∆+∆= τπ ;
(8) ( ) ( )[ ]*D*D*Y**G*G tgtttttt −Φ+−+−= − µρτχχ 11 .
The Φ  letter represents the public debt target of government B; it is exoge-
nous. The χµg  parameter represents the speed of adjustment of the public
deficit to the level required to reach Φ .
This fiscal framework is a bit more complicated than case 1 in LWL, because
both fiscal instruments (tax rate and public spending) are endogenous: one is
set as the outcome of a game with the other authorities (eqn. 7), whereas the
other is set according to a feedback rule which is set such that the fiscal deficit
remains under control (eqn. 8), in the spirit of LWL.
The introduction of these two equations in the fiscal framework of government
B aims at three objectives, plus that of being as close as possible to LWL for-
mulation. First, we compute Nash-bargaining equilibria to assess the gains from
coordination; we thus need a loss function of type (7). Second, the cost of tax
collection is not sufficient to limit fiscal policy toughly in the short run, so that we
need equation (8) which is more stringent. Third, some macroeconomic models
in the EMU adopt equation (8) as the sole strategic behaviour for all govern-
ments involved in the model14 and it is interesting to shed light on the differences
between the results obtained via equation (8) with that obtained via the policy
design for government A (eq. 6).
Of course, the fact that government B controls two instruments (rather than
one for government A15) and has the same number of targets as government A
should not lead to the conclusion that the “constrained” authority is freer than
                                                          
14 See Barrel and Sefton (1997), Capoen and Villa (1997), Jensen and Jensen (1995),
Mitchell et al. (2000), van der Ploeg (1995).
15 Actual public spending in country A is supposed to be constant and set equal to a tar-
get level, GA.
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government A.16 In our short-run Keynesian framework, a limit on public deficit is
a strong constraint for a government as far as the stabilisation of output and in-
flation to their respective steady states is concerned.
2.3. The ECB
The monetary union is characterised by the uniqueness of the nominal short
run interest rate (i) and the independence of the ECB. The ECB is assumed to
implement its monetary policy through the setting of this nominal rate. Difficulties
regarding the definition and level of money supply in a monetary union and the
complications due to the instability of money demand in financial economies are
thus avoided. The ECB minimises the respective average and squared devia-
tions of inflation and output from their initial steady states:
(9) 22
2
1
2
0 22 M,t
tttt
t k
*
k
*YY
kLM ρππ ∆+

 +∆+

 +∆=  with 
2
*
i tttM,t
ππρ +−=
The ECB is also supposed to be reluctant to deviate the real interest rate from
the steady state. Large deviations of the real interest rate have costly effects on
the patrimonial equilibrium: if the real interest rate soars in the short run, this will
provoke a steep increase in public debt in both countries, unless government A
increases its tax rate dramatically and government B decreases its public
spending sharply. Both moves in fiscal policy are costly for the governments, but
they are also for the ECB: they reduce the future capacity of governments to
stabilise output and inflation, so that the burden of future shocks might fall on
the central bank. More generally, the reluctance of the ECB towards large varia-
tions in the real interest rate could be justified by the ECB’s concern for a stable
aggregate private investment. Or, the ECB may want to prevent the banking
system from being weakened by frequent and large swings in the Repo rate
which they would have to pass on to their customers.
2.4. A Remark
Macroeconomic models usually give the priority to inflation in the central bank
loss function, according to the “credibility” argument: the government inflation
bias needs a tough reaction by Central bankers (Rogoff 1985). Although our
model does not bear on such imperfections as the inflation bias, we have made
sure that our specifications for fiscal and monetary policies do not depart on this
point from mainstream literature. With no costs for the use of fiscal or monetary
instruments, 1k  should have been superior to 0k  and ( )01 k/k  should have
been superior to ( )01 a/a . In our formulation with costs, this latter condition can
be rewritten as:
(10) ( ) ( )3201021 aaa/ak/kk −+>− ,
                                                          
16 I thank Campbell Leith and Henri Sterdyniak for raising this issue.
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since the cost for using the interest rate reduces the capacity of the ECB to curb
inflation, and the cost for using the tax rate and the cost for increasing public
debt reduce the capacity of governments to stabilise output. We will choose pa-
rameters which verify this condition.
3. Parameters
Since analytical solutions of the model in the face of shocks are intractable,
we set the model in deviation from the steady-state and we adopted a parame-
ter set in order to study the dynamic paths of model variables following the
shocks. Our central parameter set is given in table 1. We chose some of them
so that fiscal and monetary short-term multipliers match those of the macroe-
conometric international model MIMOSA (see Le Bihan and Lerais 1998).
Output is normalised at unity, and steady-state government spending is 19.7%
of GDP, i.e. the amount of funds for net expenditures in the general budget of
France in 1999. Initial steady state public debt is equal to 30% of GDP and cor-
responds to net public debt in France in 1994, thus before the cyclical rise in
public deficits in the early nineties had been converted in public debt. The real
equilibrium interest rate is 1% and corresponds to the gap between the interest
rate and the GDP growth rate in France in 1999.17
Table 1
Parameters and Steady-State Values of Variables
Parameters α β χ ε λ η µ gµ
0.35 2.50 0.85 0.20 0.25 0.20 0.30 0.30
Loss functions 0a 1a 2a 3a 0k 1k 2k
0.90 0.50 1.00 1.00 0.1 2.50 1.00
Initial values D/Y F/Y W/Y ρ τ Φ /Y
0.30 0.00 0.30 0.01 0.20 0.30
                                                          
17 It has been checked that results were not sensitive to the initial value of the public
debt to GDP ratio. The fact that both countries apparently share the same basic parame-
ters and that the model is set in deviations from the initial steady state is not inconsistent
with one of them being more constrained (country B) than the other (country A). Stated
differently, making both countries explicitly different (one would have a higher debt than
the other) would not change the outcomes.
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IV. Shocks and Policies
We now analyse the reactions of the two governments and the ECB after a
symmetric supply or demand shock. The supply shock consists in a 1 point in-
crease in the inflation rate. The demand shock takes the form of a permanent
increase in the planned wealth to GDP ratio which reduces consumption in the
short run. We show that most conclusions at Nash equilibrium are robust what-
ever the specification of the shock, be it a supply or a demand one.
The numerical simulations below are computed under two different specifica-
tions for policies. In the first one, we compute non-cooperative Nash equilibrium
between the three authorities18, whereas in the second, we compute cooperative
Nash bargaining solutions between the three policy makers. These cooperative
solutions are reached after the product of the game earnings for the three play-
ers has been maximised. Game earnings for each player are equal to the differ-
ence between the loss incurred at the Nash equilibrium and the one incurred at
the cooperative equilibrium. It has always been checked that net earnings were
positive.
1. A Symmetric Supply Shock
Contrary to the case of a demand shock, the supply shock always creates a
tension between the inflation and output targets. The tension is not only be-
tween the instruments – which instrument can offset the shock at the least cost?
– but also within each authority – which target will be preferred?
1.1. The Dynamics at the Nash Equilibrium
The supply shock provokes a steadily decrease in the output of both countries
which is equal to 4% in the long run for each (see table 2). Inflation increases
immediately from 3 and 2 percentage points for countries A and B, respectively,
and stabilises 4 percentage points higher than in the pre-shock situation.
Since the ECB has been supposed to have a preference for inflation stability
over output stability19, the nominal interest rate is raised so that the real interest
rate is increased by almost 200 basis points in the short run, and almost 300 in
the long run. This policy has two types of effects in the model: first, it dampens
inflationary trends in the short run through its negative effect on the aggregate
demand. Second, it raises net interests sharply and is likely to put heavy pres-
sure on fiscal policy.
                                                          
18 When implementing its policy, each player considers the others’ actions as given.
19 In the statutes of the ECB (Treaty establishing the European Community, art. 105), it
is specified that the primary objective for the Bank is “to maintain price stability” and that
output stability might be a second objective as far as it does not jeopardise the primary
one.
Table 2
Effects of a Symmetric Private Supply Shock
Nash equilibrium Nash bargaining
Country A Country A Country B Country B Country A Country A Country B Country B
2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010
Y (%) -1,90 -4,12 -4,19 -3,87 -2,99 -4,00 -3,07 -4,00
Pi (points) 3,04 3,61 2,06 3,75 2,37 3,09 2,40 3,09
Tau (points) -0,36 0,98 -0,39 -0,34 -0,01 0,01 0,03 0,02
G (points of
GDP
- - -0,96 -1,21 - - -0,01 0,01
B/Y (points of
GDP)
3,92 11,34 0,07 0,00 -0,29 0,14 0,00 0,00
F/Y (points of
GDP)
-1,80 -5,92 1,80 5,92 0,16 -0,07 -0,16 0,07
Losses 23,33 151,28 18,07 20,66 10,95 19,20 11,36 19,16
ECB’s losses 20,77 43,85 15,17 25,45
Real interest
rate (points)
1,89 2,90 0,11 0,04
NB1: results are set in deviations from the initial steady state values.
NB2: country B is fettered by the dispositions of the Stability Pact.
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Government A tries to focus on the output deviations and to offset the nega-
tive shock: the tax rate is reduced in the short run. But the resulting steep
growth in public debt (which is also due to the feedbacks of the higher real inter-
est rate on public net interests) leads government A to increase the tax rate
sharply in the long run (+1 point). This way, it reduces the inflationary conse-
quences of public debt accumulation. Public debt however stabilises at an un-
precedented peak: 11 points of GDP over its initial steady-state value!
The reversal of fiscal policy in country A between the short and the long run is
quite enlightening on the effects of public debt on inflation: debt is inflationary,
not because of the existence of seigniorage or inflation surprise, but because
debt is incorporated into a wealth effect. The existence of non-Ricardian con-
sumers enables government A to be also non-Ricardian: it does not have to
satisfy ex ante its present value budget constraint because it is well aware that
macroeconomic mechanisms at equilibrium will bear the costs of satisfying its
constraint ex post.
As for government B, it is able to reduce the tax rate in the short and in the
long run, because its spending is set in accordance with the satisfaction of a
constant public debt to GDP ratio. In the short run, the constraint on its public
deficit puts a heavy weigth on its capacity to stabilise the output: it departs in
absolute value by more than 4% from its initial steady state level, whereas the
deviation of output in country A is below 2%. In the mid-run, however, the stabil-
ity of the public debt ratio reduces inflationary pressures as well as their nega-
tive consequences on competitiveness: the trade balance thus increases and in
the long run, country B’s net external position has grown by almost 6 points of
the GDP. In fine, output in country B stabilises slightly closer to the initial steady
state in comparison with country A.
Losses for both governments are quite similar in the short run, but at odds in
the long run: the difference between both depends quite exclusively on fiscal in-
struments and public debts. The short term fiscal policy by government A is very
costly in the longer run: as stated earlier, public debt soars and necessitates that
the tax rate be increased by almost 1 point – in comparison, the tax rate in
country B moves by 0.3 point in absolute value. Note also that the more restric-
tive monetary policy, the costlier fiscal policy in country A.
What could be learned from this equilibrium? First, in our setting, the govern-
ment with sound public finances, and thus able to make its public deficit depart
from the steady state, is more able to stabilise the output the closest to the initial
equilibrium in the short run. Second, it is less able to curb inflation. In this strat-
egy, it is outpaced by the government whose hands are tied. In the long run, the
government with initial sound public finance incurs a reversal in its fiscal policy:
public debt has increased so much that stopping its growth has become the pri-
mary objective of the fiscal policy maker.
1.2. The Gains from Coordination
Coordination between the three policy makers make each country face a more
equitable share of the burden of the shock in the short run and increases the
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homogeneity in their business cycles in the long run. Output decreases more in
country A with coordinated policies in comparison with the Nash equilibrium,
whereas it decreases less in country B; inflation increases less in country A in
comparison with the Nash equilibrium, whereas it increases more in country B
(table 2).
Consequently, losses for both governments are now close one to the other in
the short and in the long run, quite at odds with the situation at the Nash equilib-
rium. Coordination is very productive for government A in the short run in that its
loss is now lower than the one incurred by government B; this situation was the
opposite with uncoordinated policies. This new result depends heavily on fiscal
and monetary policies. The latter is very slightly restrictive (the real interest rate
rises by 10 basis points, in comparison with 200 when policies were non coop-
erative), so that fiscal policy is initially restrictive (rather than expansionary in the
Nash equilibrium) – between 2000 and 2001, the tax rate increases by 0.3 point
from its initial value –, and then neutral (rather than restrictive in the Nash equi-
librium). Public debt therefore remains almost stable in proportion to the GDP.
Coordinated policies also give rise to a change in the assignment of instru-
ments – monetary and fiscal – to targets. Whereas government A had a prefer-
ence for the output target while the ECB had a preference for the inflation target
at the Nash equilibrium, they now seem to have switched their preferences:
government A tries to offset the inflationary consequences of the shock via a re-
duction in consumption (the disposable income is reduced) and the ECB does
not have to implement a monetary policy restrictive enough to curb inflation as
early as in the short run.
Due to the homogeneity of the business cycles in the monetary union, trade
balances and the net external positions are stable at their initial steady state
values. Whereas a substantial part of the stabilisation process was realised
through the real wealth effect at the Nash equilibrium, it is no longer the case
when policies are coordinated; the convergence of both economies in the face
of a symmetric shock has been thus greatly improved.
2. A Symmetric Demand Shock
A demand shock is easier to stabilise than a supply one thanks to the ab-
sence of tension between the inflation and output targets. In the long run, the
output comes back to its initial steady state level.
2.1. The Nash Equilibrium
After a negative symmetric private demand shock (table 3), at Nash equilib-
rium between the three policy-makers, the nominal interest rate decreases in the
monetary union and government 1 implements an expansionary fiscal policy. In
country B, the lack of fiscal room for manœuvre results in larger decreases in
the output level and the inflation rate than in country A.
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After this demand shock, government A has decreased immediately its tax
rate, so that its public debt has risen up to almost 1 point of GDP. The conse-
quences of this fiscal policy are twofold: they dampen the domestic negative
shock but, meanwhile, they raise a trade deficit vis-à-vis country B. This latter
element provokes an increase in the net external assets of country B (F is nega-
tive) and therefore helps to dampen the shock in this country through the ‘real
wealth effect’. Nonetheless, as government B is unable to implement an expan-
sionary fiscal policy, the economic crises are long to overcome and the ECB has
to reduce its interest rate sharply, the real interest cut being up to almost 80 ba-
sis points in the long run. This leads finally to a steep reduction in the public
debt to GDP ratio (in country A) which comes back to its initial level.
Contrary to the case of a symmetric supply shock, differences between both
governments’ losses are very small in the long run. In the short run however, the
government with sound public finances suffers from the highest losses, in com-
parison with government B.
2.2. The Nash Bargaining Solutions
Cooperative solutions give rise to more expansionary fiscal and monetary
policies in the short run. These thus permit to reduce the scope of the negative
shock at the monetary union level.
Consequently, the ECB faces less incentive to implement an expansionary
policy in the long run – the decrease in the real interest rate is smaller (in abso-
lute values) than at the Nash equilibrium –, so that public debt is 0.5 point of
GDP higher than at the initial steady state. Hence, government A’s loss in the
long run is only slightly inferior to its loss at the Nash equilibrium.
Moreover, differences between both governments’ losses in the long run are
still substantial, whereas they were only marginal after a supply shock at the co-
operative equilibrium. Contrary to the case with a supply shock, policies here
are more expansionary in the short run than at the Nash equilibrium: the subse-
quent debt rise quite heavily burdens government A.
V. The Costs of the Stability Pact
At the Nash equilibrium, in the case of a symmetric shock, either a supply or a
demand one, the fact that one government is constrained by the dispositions of
the SGP may force the other, more solvent, government to bear the brunt of
shocks – it is this government, and not the constrained one, that bears the major
part of these shocks. This appears clearly in graphs 1 and 2. As early as 4 and 3
quarters after the supply or demand shock, respectively, government A faces a
higher loss than government B, due notably to the substantial increase in the
public debt to GDP ratio.
Table 3
Effects of a Symmetric Private Demand Shock
Nash equilibrium Nash bargaining
Country A Country A Country B Country B Country A Country A Country B Country B
2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010 2001 2010
Y (%) -0,28 0,00 -0,32 0,00 -0,09 -0,01 -0,16 0,00
Pi (points) -0,53 -0,80 -0,68 -0,79 -0,23 -0,41 -0,32 -0,,41
Tau (points) -0,18 -0,22 -0,04 -0,01 -0,22 -0,20 -0,22 -0,23
G (points of
GDP
- - 0,14 0,22 - - -0,02 -0,03
B/Y (points of
GDP)
0,82 0,07 -0,01 0,00 0,50 0,48 0,00 0,00
F/Y (points of
GDP)
-0,41 0,00 0,41 0,00 -0,25 -0,25 0,25 0,25
Losses 0,91 0,37 0,32 0,32 0,33 0,36 0,12 0,14
ECB’s losses 1,32 2,15 0,64 0,87
Real interest
rate (points)
-0,63 -0,76 -0,67 -0,67
NB1: results are set in deviations from the initial steady state values.
NB2: country B is fettered by the dispositions of the Stability Pact.
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Graph 1
Losses – Symmetric Supply Shock – Nash Equilibrium
Graph 2
Losses – Symmetric Demand Shock – Nash Equilibrium
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The country with sound public finances thus clearly undergoes feedback ef-
fects of the Stability Pact. These are twofold. First, as already mentioned, this
country has to participate in the stabilisation of the whole monetary union. The
interdependence between the economies increases the strategic interactions
between fiscal policies. This interdependence is, of course, more intense as one
country lacks fiscal room for manœuvre. Second, these interactions also involve
monetary policy. In this peculiar setting, which hinges on an extended version of
the macroeconomic model of the FTPL developed by LWL (2000), the govern-
ment of country A has to stop the public debt to GDP ratio from increasing be-
cause monetary policy is active (the nominal interest rate reacts more than one
for one with the inflation rate). Government A is therefore fettered in its policy
choices by the growth in its debt and by the relative stringency of monetary pol-
icy: a higher debt entails more inflationary pressure which the government in-
tends to curb; and a restrictive monetary policy prevents output stabilisation.
Nash bargaining solutions in the case of a supply shock give very interest-
ing results: as already mentioned, coordination totally cancels the costs emerg-
ing from the Stability Pact (graph 3): losses for both governments are exactly
similar.
Graph 3
Losses – Symmetric Supply Shock – Nash Bargaining
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The share of the burden has thus been greatly improved by the coordination
of fiscal and monetary policies. This is an important result in our framework.
Though the situation of the so-called ‘fiscally-constrained’ country had appeared
more favourable than that of the country with sound public finance (see the loss
functions at the Nash equilibrium), it is no longer the case when policies are co-
ordinated. Having its fiscal hand tied is beneficial only to the extent that policies
are non-cooperative. It becomes detrimental to the constrained country if Nash-
bargaining solutions are implemented. Although losses for the government of
this country are minimised at the cooperative equilibrium, in comparison with the
non-cooperative one, this government would be in a better position if its public
deficits had not been limited.
The improvement in the situation of the country with sound public finance
does not emerge after a demand shock though (see graph 4). Government A
remains in a worse situation than government B (see section IV.2).
Graph 4
Losses – Symmetric Demand Shock – Nash Bargaining
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As for the ECB, its losses are higher than both governments’, except at the
Nash equilibrium after a supply shock (see graphs 1 to 4). Though loss functions
differ – the ECB’s includes EMU-average output and inflation deviations and de-
viations of the real interest rate, while governments’ incorporate domestic tar-
gets, tax rate and public debt deviations –, it is obvious that the costs of using
the interest rate are the most prominent one in the losses incurred by the central
bank.20 They show by how much the ECB is being involved in the stabilisation of
the Euro-area macroeconomic shocks. Consider no government had been fet-
tered by a balanced-budget rule: the symmetric shock could have been com-
pensated by appropriate fiscal policies without any increase in the public debt to
GDP ratio.21 The ECB would not have been forced into a more stringent policy.
In an asymmetric fiscal framework like ours, the ECB has to compensate for the
inability of one government to implement the appropriate fiscal policy.
Public debt implications in this model are thus substantial: first, they change
the timing of fiscal policy. From ‘active’ in the short run, they can become ‘pas-
sive’ in the long run, undergoing progressively the “law” of an active monetary
policy. Depending on the reactions of governments in the long run, the ECB also
is progressively being fettered in the timing as well as the scope of its policy
choices, and its ability to smooth economic fluctuations is affected by the con-
straints of the Pact (see also Hughes Hallett and Vines 1993, and Jensen 1997).
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have used an open economy version of Leith and Wren-
Lewis (2000) model. This model enables a precise and comprehensive analysis
of the interactions between monetary and fiscal policies. The most recent contri-
butions concerning monetary rules, fiscal rules, and the net wealth effect are in-
corporated and shed light on the possible effects of public debt on the inflation
rate, without having to introduce seignoriage or an inflationary tax. We also con-
sidered the specific case of an asymmetric fiscal framework in order to illustrate
some possible drawbacks of the SGP, namely, that it may reduce the ability of
governments and the ECB to implement stabilisation policies in the Euro area.
In fact, an asymmetric fiscal framework between countries forming a monetary
union could well have strong feedback policy effects on the implementation of
fiscal as well as monetary policies. First, the country whose fiscal policy is aimed
at stabilising the economy may suffer from its interdependence with the other
country: a negative shock in the latter country may provoke a higher public debt
in the first country; and this may impede its future capacities to implement an
                                                          
20 EMU-average output and inflation deviations in the mid and long run do not depart
much from domestic ones.
21 The GDP slumps which reduce tax revenues would have been compensated by lower
tax rates which would have increased tax revenues either through higher incentives to
produce (Laffer argument, see Canto et al. 1978) or through rising demand (Christ argu-
ment, see Christ 1968).
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active fiscal policy.22 Hence, the country with initial sound public finances has to
intervene in order to stabilise the whole monetary union, but it is more and
more fettered in its policy choices as time moves forward if monetary policy is
stringent.
Second, the ECB, in its goal of “price stability”, may not be immune either
against the consequences of fiscal policies. It may have to “substitute” for the
absence of fiscal policy in the country under the rule of the Pact. In the long run,
if public debt increases in relation to GDP because of the restrictive monetary
policy, the ECB has to choose between reducing the interest rate to curb debt’s
accumulation or increasing it further to prompt “good” governments to accumu-
late primary surpluses. If monetary policy is very stringent in the long run and
the “good” government is unable to reduce its deficit further, the economy of the
whole monetary union might well follow an unstable path.
Third, coordination in the case of a symmetric supply shock is productive in
that it cancels the costs emerging from the Stability Pact. A more equitable
share of the burden of the shock now falls on both governments, the “good” and
the “bad”. This result does not emerge after a demand shock.
Fourth, after a symmetric supply shock, the coordination of policies give rise
to a change in the assignment of instruments – monetary and fiscal – to targets.
The government with initial sound public finances dampens the inflationary con-
sequences of the shock and the monetary policy is substantially less restrictive
than at the uncoordinated equilibrium. This switch in the assignment of instru-
ments does not occur after a symmetric demand shock.
At last, using a dynamic-game approach might well lead to different conclu-
sions. The huge welfare losses suffered by country A in the wake of a supply
shock, for instance, might be avoided if that country could fully take into account
the negative consequences of its debt build-up, which in turn would require
looking ahead (instead of considering only the current period) when setting
taxes. This way, the relative ‘gains’ from being fettered by the dispositions of the
SGP at the Nash equilibrium would be reduced, but overall gains from coordina-
tion would not; this time, government B, rather than A, would undoubtedly bene-
fit most from the Nash-bargaining solution. However, introducing this new theo-
retical setting has been left to future research. Moreover, the short-sighted or
time-consistent way to implement fiscal policy is still under debate as French
public authorities seem about to renege in mid-2002 on their promise to reach a
balanced government budget no later than 2004, a promise they had made in
March 2002 in Barcelona!
                                                          
22 Note that, contrary to “mainstream literature” (see, for instance, Chari and Kehoe,
1998), debt monetisation is not part of the story. This is probably on this point that the
FTPL is the most attractive.
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Summary
We extend the model of Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) to the case of a two-country
monetary union, incorporating adaptive expectations. An asymmetry between the stabili-
sation properties of the two fiscal policies is introduced: only one country is fiscally-
constrained by the dispositions of the Stability Pact. Monetary and fiscal policies are set as
the outcomes of a game between the two governments and the common central bank. We
show that in case of negative symmetric shocks with a stringent monetary policy, the gov-
ernment with sound public finances is more and more fettered in his policy choices as time
moves forward while the reverse is true for the fiscally-constrained government. The costs
implied by the Stability Pact for the common central bank are also substantial. Coordinat-
ing monetary and fiscal policies after a symmetric supply shock is also shown to be suffi-
cient to cancel the costs emerging from the Pact, but it is not after a demand shock.
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